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Abstract
Basel Committee on Banking Supervision (BCBS) has published its guidance 
for operating the countercyclical capital buffer. It has, inter alia, recommended 
that credit-to-GDP ratio could be the buffer guide. This paper argues that 
BCBS buffer guide is not suitable for Emerging Market Economies (EMEs) for 
variety of reasons and showcases an alternative buffer guide, reflecting their 
underlying banking business model. It verifies the historical performance of the 
alternative buffer guide in the Indian context and finds evidence – supported 
by the corroborative behaviour of the real sector and asset markets - that the 
alternative guide tracks credit cycles in India better. The paper demonstrates that 
the alternative indicator does not adversely impact the structural drivers of credit 
growth. Accordingly, the paper recommends the alternative countercyclical 
capital buffer guidance with triggers for the build-up and release of the additional 
countercyclical capital buffer.  
Keywords: Countercyclical capital buffers, credit-to-GDP Gap, CD ratio, Credit 
aggregates, Leverage.
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1. Introduction
The recent financial crisis has redefined the broad contours of regulation of 
financial sector, globally. The G-20 Working Group 1 on Enhancing Sound 
Regulation and Strengthening Transparency, constituted in 2008, submitted its 
recommendations, which formed the blueprint for the global regulatory reform 
agenda. Procyclicality has been among the identified underlying causes for the 
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standard setters to address the problem of procyclicality. One such measure 
put forward by the Basel Committee on Banking Supervision (BCBS) was 
countercyclical capital buffers. 
In December 2010, BCBS issued Guidance for national authorities 
operating the countercyclical capital buffer recommending, inter alia, a buffer 
guide for the consideration of national authorities. In this context, relevant 
questions are: is the suggested buffer guide suitable for Emerging Market 
Economies (EMEs), especially for those which largely rely on retail model of 
banking business akin to India’s? If not, is there any alternative buffer guide 
more suitable for them? If so, what is it? This paper endeavors to address these 
questions of relevance in detail and is organised into six sections. Section 1 
outlines the BCBS set of proposals with regard to the guidance to the national 
authorities for operating the countercyclical buffer. Section 2 examines its 
suitability to EMEs. Section 3 outlines a literature review enumerating studies 
on the subject. This section attempts to position the paper in the evolution of the 
literature.  While Section 4 analyses methodology for constructing an alternative 
buffer guide customised to macro-financial environments in which banks in 
EMEs operate, Section 5 presents the historical performance of the proposed 
alternative buffer guide in the Indian context. Finally, Section 6 concludes.
2. The BCBS Proposals for Operating 
Countercyclical Capital Buffer
2.1   Objective 
A countercyclical capital buffer regime is targeted at dampening liquidity cycles. 
It mitigates the expansion in bank balance sheets and the build up of leverage 
during boom periods (CGFS, 2011) through the use of a buffer of capital to 
achieve the broader macroprudential goal of protecting the banking sector from 
periods of excess aggregate credit growth that have often been associated with 
the build up of system-wide risk. Protecting the banking sector in this context 
is not simply ensuring that individual banks remain solvent through a period of 
stress, but ensuring that the banking sector in aggregate has the capital on hand 
to help maintain the flow of credit in the economy without its solvency being 
questioned, when the broader financial system experiences stress after a period 
of excess credit growth. This primary objective could have a positive side-benefit 
of moderating effect on the build-up phase of the credit cycle. The relevant 
authority in each jurisdiction will be required to monitor credit growth and make 
assessments of whether such growth is excessive and is leading to the build up of 
system-wide risk. Based on this assessment, they will need to use their judgment 
to determine whether a countercyclical buffer requirement should be imposed. 
Principles underpinning the role of judgment and the common reference guide 
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2.2  Principles
Principle 1: (Objectives) Protecting the banking system against potential future 
losses when excess credit growth is associated with an increase in system-wide 
risk which should be the primary motive behind buffer decisions.
Principle 2: (Common reference guide) The credit/GDP guide is a useful 
common reference point in making buffer decisions. Credit includes both bank 
and non-bank sources of credit. However, it does not need to play a dominant 
role in the information used by authorities to make and explain buffer decisions. 
Authorities should explain the information used, and how it is taken into account 
in formulating buffer decisions.
Principle 3: (Risk of misleading signals) Assessments of the information 
contained in the credit/GDP guide and any other guides should be mindful 
of the behaviour of the factors that can lead them to give misleading signals. 
In assessing a broad set of information to make buffer decisions in both the 
build-up and release phases, authorities should look for evidence as to whether 
the inferences from the credit/GDP guide are consistent with those of other 
variables. Some examples of other variables that may be useful indicators in 
both phases include various asset prices; funding spreads and CDS spreads; 
credit condition surveys; real GDP growth; and data on the ability of non-
financial entities to meet their debt obligations on a timely basis. 
Principle 4: (Prompt release) Promptly releasing the buffer in times of 
stress is essential as it can help to reduce the risk of supply of credit being 
constrained by regulatory capital requirements.
Principle 5: (Other macroprudential tools) The buffer is an important 
instrument in a suite of macroprudential tools at the disposal of the authorities.
2.3  Jurisdictional reciprocity
The host authorities should take the lead in setting buffer requirements 
that would apply to credit exposures held by local entities located in their 
jurisdiction. They would also be expected to promptly inform their foreign 
counterparts of buffer decisions so that authorities in other jurisdictions can 
require their banks to respect them. Without such a level playing field on the 
minimum buffer add-on, the impact of foreign banks (not subject to buffer) 
increasing their lending in response to lower competition from domestic banks 
(subject to buffer) could undermine the buffer regime’s potential side-benefit 
of reducing excessive credit in a jurisdiction. As with the minimum capital 
requirement and capital conservation buffer, host authorities would have the 
right to demand that the countercyclical capital buffer be held at the individual 
legal entity level or consolidated level within their jurisdiction.
2.4  Communications
It is essential to build understanding and credibility in the buffer decisions 
through effective communication with all stakeholders including banks and 











4                                 The International Journal of Banking and Finance, Vol. 11, 2014-2015: 1-30
3. BCBS Buffer Guide and its Suitability to EMEs
BCBS recommends that deviation of credit-to-GDP ratio from its long-term trend 
could be a useful starting reference point for assessing the build-up of system-
wide risk in the financial system. Before recommending this buffer guide, BCBS 
considered a broad range of indicator variables. The variables assessed can be 
divided into three groups. The first includes aggregate macroeconomic variables: 
GDP growth, (real) credit growth and deviations of the credit to GDP ratio from 
a long term trend and deviations of real equity prices as well as real property 
prices from their respective long-term trend. The second includes measures of 
banking sector performance: profits (earnings) and proxies for (gross) losses. 
The final group includes proxies for the cost of funding, in the form of credit 
spreads. BCBS felt that the credit-to-GDP gap was the best performing of the 
range of variables considered. It is smoother and normalised by the size of the 
economy, and is therefore not influenced by the normal cyclical patterns of credit 
growth: Furthermore by being based on credit, it has the significant advantage 
over many of the other variables by appealing directly to the objective of the 
countercyclical capital buffer, which is to achieve the broader macroprudential 
goal of protecting the banking sector from periods of excess credit growth.  
How does the credit-to-GDP ratio behave in EMEs? An attempt is made 
to assess and verify how the credit-to-GDP gap performs in the Indian context. 
Figure 1 presents time series of bank credit- to- GDP ratio and its long-term 
trend since 1950-51. 
The trend line was based on the Hodrick-Prescott (HP) filter with λ = 
400,000 (as suggested by the BCBS guidance). Some of the observations of the 
figure 1 are as follows. Firstly, in the 1950s, 1960s, 1970s, and 1980s, credit-to-
GDP ratio was almost close to the trend. Secondly, in the 1990s the credit-to-
GDP ratio began slightly deviating from the trend but basically remained below 
but close to the trend up until 2002-03. Lastly, since 2003-04 the credit-to-GDP 
ratio remained above the trend and positive deviation widened thereafter.
 In the light of the above observations, the usefulness of credit-to-GDP 
ratio as a policy guide in the Indian context is debatable for the fundamental 
reason that the credit-to-GDP gap did not show any worthwhile variability up 
until 2002-03 with the standard deviation of the gap during 1950-51 to 2002-03 
which was estimated at just 3.0 (this finding was corroborated by the Financial 
Stability Report (June 2011) of Reserve Bank of India) though there emerged a 
significant positive gap since 2003-04 as the standard deviation almost doubled 
during this five year period. In other words, from the historical perspective, the 
credit-to-GDP gap was too small to be of any value in the Indian context for 
policy purposes. 
How to rationalise and explain the inapplicability of the BCBS guidance 
as posited above? The observed lack of variability in the credit-to-GDP gap in 
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dominated the Indian scene over the decades, though the formal credit market 
has expanded its reach in the meantime. Illustratively, analysis of share of rural 
household debt by source as revealed by All India Debt and Investment Surveys, 
is of relevance in this regard. The share of non-institutional agencies, consisting of 
money lenders, traders, landlords and friends and relatives, in the rural household 
debt remained more or less stagnant at over 30 per cent during the last 30 years. 
Approximately 40 per cent of the population across India has bank accounts. 
Furthermore, the credit market in India largely remained underdeveloped due to 
the so-called financial repression reflecting fiscal dominance. The preemption 
of banking sector resources to fund persistently large fiscal deficits was once as 
high as 63.5 per cent of net demand and time liabilities of all the banks, though 
this has waned because of financial sector reforms in the recent decade. Thus, in 
the historical sense, the credit market in India remained dormant, reflecting the 
absence of structural drivers of credit, thereby resulting in credit-to-GDP gap 
being too small to be of any use from the policy perspective. 
Thus in the ex post sense, BCBS guidance is not applicable to India. 
Besides, it is further argued below that it is not applicable going forward into the 
future either, in the ex ante sense. Essentially, the BCBS buffer guide implicitly 
assumes that the long-term trend of the credit-to-GDP ratio is a reliable proxy 
for the optimal/equilibrium credit required for an economy and any positive/
negative deviation denotes excess/deficit credit growth. This is presumably 
valid in the case of the advanced economies operating generally at equilibrium 
with full employment (potential growth), and mature and integrated financial 
markets. Points on the long-term trend line typically signify equilibrium credit 
market compatible with full employment/potential employment. However, the 
BCBS capital buffer guide of deviation of credit-to-GDP ratio from its long-term 
trend is not suitable for EMEs. Fundamentally, rise in credit-to-GDP ratio may 
be unrelated to any signs of over-leverage in the credit market. The long-term 
past trend does not represent optimal/equilibrium credit requirements of these 
economies. Factors which predominantly determine the credit-to-GDP ratio in 
the EMEs in the future include various structural drivers viz., structural shift 
from services to manufacturing (Subbarao, 2011), financial deepening from a 
low base, rising efficiency of goods markets, rising efficiency of credit markets, 
and policy initiatives to improve flow of credit to sectors like the agriculture, 
small scale units and infrastructure (Mohan, 20061). 
Most of the EMEs are refocusing on positioning manufacturing sector 
as drivers of growth, going forward. Illustratively, India’s New Manufacturing 
Policy aims to grow manufacturing about 3 per cent faster than GDP so that its 
contribution to GDP can increase from 16 per cent to 25 per cent in the next 15 
years. Typically, credit intensity of manufacturing is higher per unit of GDP. 
Further, in EMEs, various segments of the real sector continue to be outside the 
purview of the formal credit market, funded basically through informal sources 
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pace and manifests in the form of these segments seeking formal credit, there is 
a switch in sources of credit from informal to formal. 
Typically, EMEs are supply-constrained economies. As the supply 
constrains ease over time, goods markets tend to become more and more 
efficient. Rising factor mobility leading to enhanced allocative efficiency is 
one such manifestation. These improvements in goods markets generally get 
reflected in structural shifts in supply elasticities, resulting in increasing demand 
for credit to finance rising production. Over time, credit markets in EMEs 
become more efficient in intermediating funds between the users and providers 
of credit, facilitating easier fund mobility at lower transaction costs. In other 
words, as the cost of intermediation drops, credit off-take rises. Illustratively, the 
intermediation cost (defined as the spread between cost of deposits and return 
on loan assets) for the scheduled commercial banks in India consistently fell 
from 6.24 per cent in 1991-92 to 3.59 per cent in 1999-2000 and further to 3.31 
per cent in 2009-10. Moreover, there have been conscious policy initiatives in 
EMEs to augment credit flow to certain identified sectors including agriculture, 
small scale units and infrastructure. Illustratively, the Government of India, 
as part of its strategy to boost agriculture production, announced a package to 
double the flow of institutional credit to agriculture within three years starting 
2004-05. The agricultural credit in fact doubled in 2-year period, as against the 
stipulated period of three years.  
Furthermore, for EMEs including India, credit demand is also expected 
to go up due to investment needs of infrastructure and the demand for upscaling 
financial inclusion. For example, in India credit requirements for the next five 
years for infrastructure development are estimated at US $ 1 trillion. Additionally, 
subtle behavioural changes underway, typical of a fast developing economy, 
push up credit and these include, inter alia, rising consumption financed through 
debt as consumers become wealthy, i.e., behavioural changes arising out of 
wealth effect.          
Reflecting these structural determinants, the long-term trend itself would 
be bodily shifting upwards over time, thereby rendering it less and less useful as 
a secular benchmark. Consequently, any deviation (positive/negative) from the 
frequently shifting yardstick loses its theoretical underpinning. Positive deviation 
per se does not necessarily signify over-leverage nor does negative deviation 
per se necessarily denote under leverage. Therefore, credit (including bank and 
non-bank) growth in EMEs, thus, fundamentally will embody both structural 
and cyclical components. While it is necessary to address cyclical components 
through countercyclical capital buffer, structural components, on the other hand, 
should not be impacted by such buffer. In practice, it is almost impossible to 
identify and differentiate structural and cyclical components of credit growth. 
It could, however, be argued that corroborative evidence from other variables 
could be sought to decipher two components of credit growth. However, this 
exercise is fraught with the potential risk of adversely impacting the structural 
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to-GDP ratio vis-à-vis its long-term trend will be ambiguous in the context of 
EMEs. To cap this discussion, it would be apt to quote the following extracts:
The BCBS framework uses the metric “Credit to GDP ratio” 
and its upward deviation from the long term trend to signal the 
need to build up countercyclical capital buffer. This metric is not 
suitable for Indian economy and other EMEs, as was also pointed 
out in the Financial Stability Report (FSR) of June 2011, due to 
structural changes taking place in the economy on account of high 
growth rate and financial inclusion etc. (Sinha, 2011).
In a structurally transforming economy with rapid upward mobility, 
credit demand will expand faster than GDP for several reasons. 
First, India will shift increasingly from services to manufactures 
whose credit intensity is higher per unit of GDP. Second, we need 
to at least double our investment in infrastructure which will place 
enormous demands on credit. Finally, financial inclusion, which 
both the Government and the Reserve Bank are driving, will 
bring millions of low income households into the formal financial 
system with almost all of them needing credit. What all this means 
is that we are going to have to impose higher capital requirements 
on banks as per Basel III at a time when credit demand is going to 
expand rapidly. The concern is that this will raise the cost of credit 
and hence militate against growth  (Subbarao, 2011).
Hence, there is a need for an alternative buffer guide, which can 
unambiguously mirror the macro-financial environment, especially the leverage 
conditions, in which banks in EMEs operate. In fact, BCBS proposal (Principle 
2) acknowledges the fact that the credit-to-GDP ratio does not need to play a 
dominant role in the information used by authorities to make and explain buffer 
decisions. Furthermore, supervisors in each jurisdiction are free to emphasise any 
other variables and qualitative information that make sense to them for purposes 
of assessing the sustainability of credit growth and the level of system-wide risk, 
as well as in making and explaining buffer decisions. Then, what could be the 
alternative buffer guide? What does the literature offer in this regard? The next 
section reviews the relevant literature.
4. Literature Review
Ever since the BCBS has come out with the countercyclical buffer guidance 
in December 2010, there have been studies empirically verifying its usefulness 
for a variety of jurisdictions. Repullo and Saurina (2011), based on the select 
advanced economies, argued that credit-to-GDP ratio as the common reference 
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when GDP growth is high and increase them when GDP growth is low, so it 
may end up exacerbating the inherent pro-cyclicality of risk-sensitive bank 
capital regulation. Instead, they recommended deviation of credit growth with 
respect to the long-term average as a common reference point for capital buffer 
operations. This author feels that while the drawbacks of the BCBS guidance for 
capital buffers acerbating procyclicality  are properly diagnosed, the alternative 
proposed, namely credit growth gap is not suitable for EMEs in the sense 
that historical long-term trend for credit growth (backward looking) is not an 
equilibrium credit growth as explained earlier in Section 2. Hence, it does not 
reflect the realities of the EMEs.   
Geršl and Seidler (2012) criticised the BCBS guidance for the way the 
excess credit growth is defined. positive credit-to-GDP gap from the long-
term trend derived by the HP filter. They contended that the backward looking 
long-term trend is not an appropriate benchmark for assessing the excess credit 
growth, reason being that HP-filter based long-term trend does not reflect macro-
economic fundamentals of converging economies and hence does not account 
for the needed catch-up in and convergence of credit growth of EMEs vis-à-
vis credit growth of advanced economies. Instead, they proposed estimating 
equilibrium credit elasticities of the advanced EU countries (involving a suitable 
econometric model) and applying these credit elasticities to Central and East 
European (CEE) countries to arrive at credible (excess) credit growth and 
equilibrium credit level. This paper recognises the fact that credit growth in 
EMEs (what is called convergence countries) needs to catch up with that of the 
advanced economies and any methodology for assessing excessive credit growth 
of these economies should need to factor in this imperative. However, this author 
feels that the paper’s criticism of the HP filter that it does reflect the economic 
fundamentals is not fair as the problem is not with the filter per se but with 
the indicator on which the filter is applied. The HP filter is one method which 
statistically extracts the long-term trend for a time-series. If the equilibrium 
credit levels of the advanced economies were to be the benchmark for assessing 
excessive credit growth of the EMEs, the straight forward option is to compare 
the actual credit-to-GDP growth of EMEs against the long-term trend of credit-
to-GDP growth of advanced economies. More importantly, the paper ignores 
the significance of funding sources for financing identified equilibrium credit 
levels. It is that attaining estimated equilibrium credit levels financed through 
unstable source of funding is not sustainable and hence has a built in systemic 
vulnerability for the banks.     
Mathias Drehmann et al. (2011) analysed the behaviour of a wide range 
of possible indicator variables around episodes of systemic banking crises, 
drawing on the empirical evidence from more than 40 crises in 36 countries for 
setting the level of the countercyclical regulatory capital buffer requirements 
for banks. The authors found evidence that the gap between the ratio of credit 
to GDP and its long-term backward-looking trend performs best as an indicator 
for the accumulation of capital, because this variable captures the build-up 
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indicators, such as credit spreads, are better at indicating the release phase, as 
they are contemporaneous signals of banking sector distress that can precede a 
credit crunch. 
Against the above-mentioned backdrop, the alternative common reference 
point proposed in this paper does not rely on any estimated equilibrium credit 
levels. It accommodates expansion in the asst-side of the balance sheet of the 
banks and thereby the catch up in credit growth of EMEs, to the extent that it is 
financed by stable sources from the liability-side of the balance sheet. Hence, it 
ensures sustainable catch up in credit growth. Furthermore, the alternative capital 
buffer guide is not procyclical and moves in synchronisation with the business 
cycles as measured by real GDP growth. The next section attempts to present 
the methodology underlying the alternative common reference point. However, 
before the methodology is presented, it needs to be noted that this paper does 
not claim to have found the single indicator capable of guiding buffer decisions 
(both build up and release) in EMEs. All indicators provide false signals. Thus, 
no fully rule-based mechanism is perfect. Some degree of judgment, both for the 
build-up and particularly for the release phase, would be inevitable when setting 
countercyclical capital buffers in practice.   
5. Methodology for an Alternative Capital Buffer 
Guide for EMEs2
As mentioned at the outset, the countercyclical capital buffer should dampen 
liquidity cycles. The optimal candidate for buffer guide should, therefore, reflect 
the evolving macro-financial environment associated with credit growth. In 
particular, the buffer guide should be able to capture system-wide vulnerabilities 
and risks associated with what is perceived to be excessive credit growth. 
Banking business model in EMEs, including India, is basically retail in nature 
meaning that the principal source of funding for the banking business is retail 
deposit base. This business model has endured over the years, inter alia, because 
for banks in the EMEs, including India, dependence on credit risk sensitive 
purchased sources of funding is limited. This historical dependence of these 
banks on deposits as a source of funding has inherently imparted an element of 
built-in stability to the banking sector in these jurisdictions. Any departure from 
the reliance on deposits to fund credit growth, on a sustained basis, would signal 
build-up of system-wide risk.  
Theoretically it could, however, be argued that the process of financial 
development in the EMEs may involve a trend increase in securitisation, which 
would bias the proposed measure of excessive credit growth. In other words, in 
the context of pick up in securitisation, departure from the reliance on deposits 
may not necessarily signify over-leverage and thereby rising systemic risk, but 
may instead underscore financial development in the form of diversification of 
funding sources for banks involving investors, like pension funds, insurance 
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securitisation markets in EMEs, at present, are either small in size and nascent 
in stage, or non-existent. In fact, the regulatory framework in EMEs and India 
in particular underlying securitisation strives to promote orderly development of 
the securitisation market. Moreover, EMEs do have a huge untapped potential 
rural retail deposit base to harness going forward. It will, therefore, be a long 
time before securitisation markets acquire critical mass in EMEs. Secondly, any 
large deviation from the reliance on deposits as a primary source of funding on 
a sustained basis-be it due to securitization - does highlight potential build-up of 
systemic risk as market liquidity conditions tend to acquire greater influence on 
the stability of the banking sector. The episode of the failure of Northern Rock 
in the UK illustrates the case in point. Furthermore, as would be evident later in 
this section, the methodology for developing an alternative capital buffer guide 
has built-in cushion to tolerate and accommodate prudent credit growth funded 
by non-deposit sources.      
Viewed from the above stand point, it is not the credit growth per se but 
the pattern of funding of the credit growth that needs to be the criteria for the 
conduct of capital buffer operations on the theoretical premise that expansion 
of the asset-side of the balance sheet of banks (credit growth) supported by 
increasingly unstable growth of liability-side signifies worsening system-wide 
risk. Thus, capital buffers need to be built to protect banks from vulnerabilities 
arising out of excessive credit growth, not vis-à-vis GDP but vis-à-vis retail 
deposits. 
Against this back drop, rising Credit Deposit Ratio (CDR) over time 
could denote increasing system-wide leverage and hence deterioration in macro-
financial environment in which banks in EMEs operate. Ideally, the alternative 
buffer should capture the combined movement of absolute and incremental CD 
ratios.3 Absolute CD ratio measures leverage on stock basis, while incremental 
CD ratio measures leverage on flow basis. However, given the fact that from a 
purely arithmetic stand point, one is derived from the other, reflecting thereby 
a strong correlation between the two, use of both absolute CD ratio and the 
incremental CD ratio deserves a detailed justification.
Incremental CD ratio, in isolation, provides only a partial view of the 
extent of leverage by the banks. Nor does the absolute CD ratio alone give a 
complete picture on banks’ leverage. The following illustration would underscore 
this point. Let absolute CD ratio at t1 be 45 per cent (45/100) and at t2 57 per cent 
(68/120). The incremental CD ratio during t1and t2 works out to 115 per cent. 
However, ICD of 115 per cent does not necessarily signify over-leverage, as it is 
on the back of a lower absolute CD ratio at t1. Higher credit growth during t1and t2 
might be supported by an overhang of relatively large deposits at t1. To illustrate 
further, let absolute CD ratio at t1 be 75 per cent (75/100) and at t2 be 77.5 per 
cent (93/120). The incremental CD ratio during t1and t2 works out to be 90 per 
cent. However, ICD of 95 per cent does not necessarily signify under-leverage, 
as it is on the back of a relatively larger overhang of credit manifest in higher 
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only when the incremental CD ratio is seen in conjunction with the absolute CD 
ratio.                 
In fact, historically, credit aggregates - both absolute and incremental 
- have been amongst the host of variables, forming an integral part of macro-
economic and prudential policy formulation in India. In this context in particular, 
the following extract from a speech by Smt Usha Thorat (2010) assumes 
relevance:
Absolute and incremental credit aggregates (including credit 
deposit ratio) are amongst the host of variables, forming an integral 
part of macro-economic and prudential policy formulation. In 
the Indian context, an incremental credit-deposit ratio of more 
than 100 per cent, when the system itself has a high overall 
absolute credit deposit ratio (say beyond 70 per cent) is taken as 
a sign of over-leverage. A prudential focus on credit deposit ratio 
encourages the banks in India to raise deposits for funding credit 
flow and minimises the use of purchased funds. 
Against this theoretical underpinning, the methodology for constructing 
the alternative buffer guide is enumerated below:
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data analysis, moving maxima is employed especially in the area of Multivariate 
Extreme Value Theory, which is concerned with the joint distribution of 
extremes of multiple random variables. Multivariate Extreme Value Theory 
has applications in banking and finance also wherein extreme events dependent 
across different assets occur in clusters. Estimation of such joint distributions 
generally involves modeling extreme multivariate events based on Moving 
Maxima (MM) process and a multivariate extension known as Multivariate 
Maxima of Moving Maxima (M4) process (Stuart et al 1991; Chamu Morales, 
2005). 
Furthermore, literature also supported the use of maxima for calibration 
of macroprudential policy. Davis et al. (2010), inter alia, estimated the impact of 
capital adequacy and liquidity on probability of financial crisis. In particular, they 
generated the required maxima for capital adjustment and liquidity adjustment 
and both together for protecting against banking crisis anywhere in the world. 
Drawing from the work of Davis et al. use of maxima is recommended in this 
paper for calibrating countercyclical capital buffers.    
Regarding determination of weights, assigning equal weights to various 
components of a composite indicator is generally an accepted practice in the 
literature relating to financial/banking regulation. For instance, BCBS (2011) 
assigned equal weights to 5 indicators for identification of Globally Systemically 







were assigned equal weights while computing MAXCCDR4.
Thus computed MAXCCRD could be the alternative buffer guide in the 
EMEs context. Statistical details underlying the computation of MAXCCDR 
is provided in Appendix 1. The theoretical interpretation of MAXCCDR is 
unambiguous, unlike the credit-deposit ratio. Deviations from the long-term 
trend of the MAXCCDR (TMAXCCDR) do reflect underlying changes in the 
macro-financial environment i.e. leveraged funding conditions in which banks 
in EMEs operate. The long-term trend is computed using Hodrick Prescott 
(HP) filter with lambda (λ) = 400000 with the help of E-Views, as suggested 
by the BCBS. In the literature, there were various detrending methods and 
Rochelle and Ralf (2011) provided an excellent summary of these methods and 
the implications thereof. Any practical attempt to detrend a series would need 
to involve some consideration of issues such as the deterministic or stochastic 
nature of the trend and the most appropriate filter to use. The MAXCCDR, based 
on an augmented Dickey-Fuller test, has a unit root and thus has a stochastic 
trend. This implies that the HP filter, which is able to remove a unit root, is more 
appropriate to apply to MAXCCDR since deterministic detrending methods will 
generate spurious cycles. Thus, contrary to the stand taken by Geršl and Seidler 
(2012), this paper supports HP filter methodology for detrending.  
Actual MAXCCDR being higher than the computed trend MAXCCDR 
(positive gap) depicts the situation wherein the three-year window moving 
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macro-financial environment of over-leverage5. On the other hand, negative 
gap denotes under-leverage. Next section attempts to present the historical 
performance of MAXCCDR in the context of Indian banks using India 
relevant data.
6. Historical Performance of MAXCCDR
 
The computed MAXCCDR and TMAXCCDR on the basis of the above-
methodology, involving data since 1950-51 is presented in Figure 2. Analysis 
of Figure 2 reveals the following:
During the last 60 years, banking sector in India operated, by and large, 
below but closer to the long-term trend. This means that leverage position 
of Indian banks on a secular basis remained in balance. Further, there have 
been 5 episodes of over leverage (positive gap) during mid-1950s, mid-1960s, 
mid-1970s, mid-1990s and since 2003-04. Out of these 5 episodes, there were 
3 episode of positive gap (during mid-1950s, mid-1960s and since 2003-04) 
exceeding the long-term trend by a substantial margin.     
There have been 3 episodes of under-leverage (negative gap) during late 
1950s, late 1970s to early 1990s and during 1998-99 to 2003-04. Till 1965-
66, the amplitude of alternate swings of phases of under leverage and over-
leverage, as measured by standard deviation at 27.4, was indeed high. Since 
1965-66 to 1995-96, there has been a discernible moderation in amplitude 
of credit cycles as standard deviation during this period was estimated at 8. 
Since 1995-96, alternate phases of pronounced under and over-leverage are 
again apparent as standard deviation rose to 23. There was a brief period of 
over-leverage during mid-1990s followed by a prolonged period of under-
leverage till 2003-04, which was replaced by a phase of over-leverage since 
then. Meaning, credit cycles have relatively become more pronounced in India 
since mid-1990s.  
From the above exposition, it could be inferred that the proposed 
alternative buffer guide is able to track phases of over/under leverage in the 
banking sector in India. Can, thus, MAXCCDR be taken as lead indicator for 
capital buffer operations? The BCBS guidance cautioned about the potential 
possibility of misleading signals emanating from the buffer guide and hence 
recommended looking for evidence as to whether the inferences from the 
buffer guide are consistent with those of other variables such as real GDP 
growth, asset prices, etc. So, do the phases of over/under leverage in the 
banking sector, as identified by the MAXCCDR, correspond/coincide with the 
phases of over/under-leveraging in the Indian real sector? In other words, how 
does the MAXCCDR map and track the performance of the economic activity, 
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6.1  MAXCCDR and the Real Sector
The real GDP growth in percentage since 1950-51 is presented in Figure 3. It 
is evident from the Figure 3 that until 1990-91, volatility in real GDP growth 
was indeed very high. The decadal average of real GDP growth and the volatility 
therein are shown in Table 1 below.
Table 1: Decadal Growth and volatility of real GDP







Analysis of MAXCCDR and real GDP growth vis-à-vis credit-to-GDP 
ratio and the real GDP would be attempted on the basis of the data since 1990-
91 for the following reasons:
The real GDP growth prior to 1990-91 was characterized by high 
volatility. However, the real GDP growth was on a higher trajectory thereafter 
on the back of the economic reforms ushered-in since 1990-91. Financial 
sector reforms - which were a significant component of these economic 
reforms – reduced preemption of resources of the banks, thereby increasing 
the contribution of bank credit to real GDP growth.
The Figure 4 presents credit-to-GDP gap (ratio minus the trend) and 
the real GDP growth during 1990-91 to 2009-10. The Figure 5 presents 
MAXCCDR gap (MAXCCDR minus MAXCCDR trend) and the real GDP 
growth during the same period. Based on Figure 4 and Figure 5, the following 
observations are indeed striking:
Firstly, there is a discernible lack of co-movement (syncronisation) 
between the credit-to-GDP gap and the real GDP growth. On the contrary, 
there is a clear co-movement (syncronisation) between the MAXCCDR gap 
and the real GDP growth. Secondly,  the correlation coefficient between credit-
to-GDP gap and the real growth in GDP, apart from being extremely sensitive 
to the choice of the start and end dates, has a negative bias in general. On the 
contrary, the correlation coefficient between the MAXCCDR gap and the real 
growth in GDP, apart from being robust to the choice of the start and end dates, 
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Table 2: Credit-to-GDP gap and real GDP growth versus MAXCCDR gap and 
real GDP growth:  Correlation Coefficient
Credit-to-GDP gap and GDP MAXCCDR gap and GDP
1990-91 to 2009-10 0.53 0.66
1990-91 to 2003-04 -0.08 0.24
2004-05 to 2009-10 -0.13 0.69
Note:  Statistical significance of correlation coefficients is presented in Appendix 2
Similar observations are evident if real GDP growth is replaced with real 
GDP gap (difference between real GDP growth and the long-term trend based on 
HP filter with λ = 400,000) as can be seen from the Table 3 below:
Table 3: Credit-to-GDP gap and real GDP gap versus MAXCCDR gap and real 
GDP gap:  Correlation Coefficient
Credit-to-GDP gap and GDP MAXCCDR gap and GDP gap
1990-91 to 2009-10 0.38 0.57
1990-91 to 2003-04 -0.13 0.22
2004-05 to 2009-10 -0.23 0.76
Note:  Statistical significance of correlation coefficients is presented in Appendix 2
The fundamental implication of these observations is that credit-to-
GDP ratio has a procyclical bias. It would call for release of additional capital 
when real GDP growth accelerates and it would call for build-up of additional 
capital when the real GDP growth decelerates, as is evident from Figure 4. 
Illustratively, during the three-year period of 2006-07 to 2008-09, real GDP 
growth decelerated from 9.7 per cent to 9.2 per cent, and further to 6.7 per cent. 
During these years, credit-to-GDP gap rose from 11.9 per cent to 14.0 per cent, 
and further to 15.4 per cent. Following BCBS guidance, countercyclical capital 
buffer would have hit the upper limit of 2.5 per cent of the risk-weighted assets. 
On the contrary, as is evident from Figure 5, MAXCCDR gap during this period 
fell from 47.7 per cent to 24.5 per cent and further to 14.1 per cent calling for 
release of countercyclical capital buffers. These findings are in agreement with 
those of Repullo and Saurina (2011). According to them, the basic drawback of 
the credit-to-GDP ratio is as follows: 
The problems with the credit-to-GDP gap variable may be traced to the 
following two sources. First, there is the empirical regularity that credit usually 
lags the business cycle (see, for example, the evidence in Giannone, Lenza, and 
Reichlin, 2010). In particular, in downturns the credit-to-GDP ratio continues to 
be high due to greater credit demand by households and firms (making use of 
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even negative, GDP growth. Second, the use of deviations of the credit-to-GDP 
ratio with respect to its trend compounds the problem, because it takes some 
time before the ratio crosses the trend line”.  
This author in total agreement with the above argument. As is evident 
from the Figure 5 and the above results of coefficient of correlation, MAXXCDR 
gap apparently does not suffer from these flaws. Furthermore, from the EMEs’ 
perspective, as explained earlier, credit-to-GDP gap may call for additional 
capital requirements even if credit growth (the numerator) is driven by structural 
factors. MAXXCCDR gap does not curtail credit growth in so far as it is financed 
by a stable source of funding. Thus, MAXXCD is not only not procyclical, but 
also accommodates structural drivers of credit growth. 
6.2  MAXCCDR and the Asset Markets
How does MAXCCDR (vis-à-vis credit to GDP ratio) map the asset market 
behaviour? Does the phase of over/under-leverage in the banking sector, as 
measured by MAXCCDR gap, reflect asset price movements? This analysis was 
carried out involving data during 1990-91 to 2009-10. In this paper, return on 
Bombay Stock Exchange’s 30-stock benchmark Sensex was taken as a proxy 
for asset prices. Figure 6 presents performance of actual asset prices (Sensex 
returns) vis-à-vis credit-to-GDP gap and Figure 7 presents actual asset prices 
(Sensex returns) vis-à-vis MAXCCDR gap. 
It is obvious from the Figure 6 and Figure 7 that there is a relatively better 
co-movement (syncronisation) between MAXCCDR gap and Sensex returns 
than between credit-to-GDP gap and Sensex returns, especially in 2000s. These 
graphical observations are supported by the relevant coefficients of correlation 
as in Table 4 below. 
Table 4: Credit-to-GDP gap and Sensex Return versus MAXCCDR gap and 
Sensex Return:  Correlation Coefficient
Credit-to-GDP gap and 
Sensex
MAXCCDR gap and 
Sensex
1990-91 to 2009-10 0.11 0.18
1990-91 to 2003-04 0.23 -0.16
2004-05 to 2009-10 -0.33 0.63
Note:  Statistical significance of correlation coefficients is presented in Appendix 2
Similar observations are evident if Sensex returns is replaced with Sensex 
returns gap (difference between Sensex returns and the long-term trend based on 
HP filter with λ = 400,000), as can be seen from the Table 5 below:
Based on the above analysis, it can be inferred that MAXXCDR gap is 
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Table 5: Credit-to-GDP gap and Sensex gap versus MAXCCDR gap and Sensex 
gap:  Correlation Coefficient
Credit-to-GDP gap and 
Sensex gap
MAXCCDR gap and 
Sensex gap
1990-91 to 2009-10 0.26 0.30
1990-91 to 2003-04 0.27 -0.15
2004-05 to 2009-10 -0.28 0.59
Note:  Statistical significance of correlation coefficients is presented in Appendix 2
6.3   MAXCCDR and Credit Losses
Now, how does the MAXCCDP gap map the credit loss behaviour? Theoretically, 
the over-leverage phase characterised by positive MAXCCDR gap signifies 
excessive exuberance underpinned by large-scale credit expansion on the back 
of improving asset quality. In contrast, the under-leverage phase characterised 
by negative MAXCCDR gap signifies excessive pessimism underpinned by 
large-scale credit contraction on the back of worsening asset quality. Therefore, 
the MAXCCDR gap should move negatively with credit losses. In order to 
examine this, a simple single-variate regression model linking MAXCCDR gap 
to credit loss was estimated. Gross non-performing assets (GNPA) represent 
credit losses. The regression results are presented below.
Dependent Variable: GNPA (growth rate of gross non-performing assets)
Method: Least Squares
Date: 11/28/15   Time: 18:32
Sample: 1997 2009 (Asset quality data for India prior to 1997 not available)
Included observations: 13
Variable Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob.  
C 5.169231 2.587686 1.997627 0.0711
MAXCCDRGAP -0.571511 0.213128 -2.681538 0.0213
R-squared 0.395294     Mean dependent var 5.169231
Adjusted R-squared 0.340320     S.D. dependent var 11.48727
S.E. of regression 9.330035     Akaike info criterion 7.444993
Sum squared resid 957.5451     Schwarz criterion 7.531908
Log likelihood -46.39245     F-statistic 7.190647
Durbin-Watson stat 0.715379     Prob(F-statistic) 0.021349
    
The coefficient of MAXCCDR gap is negative and statistically significant. 
The interpretation of the results of the regression model is: over-leverage phase 
of MAXCCDR gap being positive is a forerunner of impending credit losses. 
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To sum up, inferences about credit cycle from MAXCCDR are cross-
verified for  evidence of consistency and support from the behaviour of the real 
sector, the asset market, and credit loss. The graphical analysis and the measures 
of correlation coefficient corroborate the inferences about the credit cycles from 
MAXCCDR. Thus the historical performance of MAXCCDR proved to be 
reliable.
6.4  Determination of Lower and Upper Triggers of MAXCCDR 
The next step was to determine lower and upper threshold triggers for build up 
and release of capital buffer for Indian banks. The BCBS guidance contains 
criteria for determination of such triggers, as follow.
Criteria for the minimum threshold (L) when the guide would start to 
indicate a need to build up capital.
Criteria 1. L should be low enough, so that banks are able to build 
up capital in gradual fashion before a potential crisis. As banks are 
given one year to raise additional capital, this means that the indicator 
should breach the minimum at least 2-3 years prior to a crisis. 
Criteria 2. L should be high enough so that no additional capital is 
required during normal times. 
Criteria for the maximum (H) at which point no additional capital would 
be required, even if the gap would continue to increase.
Criteria 3. H should be low enough, so that the buffer would be at its 
maximum prior to major banking crises. 
The BCBS criteria/rationale are the broad principles for the determination 
of lower and upper threshold triggers for build up and release, and are valid 
across jurisdictions. For the purpose of fixing the thresholds, behaviour of the 
credit-to-GDP gap in the runup to the banking crises was analysed by the BCBS. 
It was generally observed that a gap exceeding 10 per cent on a sustained basis 
proceded the banking crisis. On the basis of this observation, the maximum 
threshold has been fixed by the BCBS at 10 per cent gap. To ensure that Criterion 
1 is met, L has been set at 2 so that the rule would  require the build up of capital 
for all major banking crises 2-3 years in advance. 
The practical difficulty of applying BCBS guidance for determining ‘L’ 
and ‘H’ in the Indian context is that India has not suffered any banking crisis 
so far and hence it is not possible to observe the behaviors of MAXCCDR gap 
in the runup to the crisis. Instead, analysis of percentage positive deviation of 
the MAXCCDR from its long-term trend during the pronounced three over-
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2009-10) in the last 60 years in India, as presented in Figure 8, indicateds that the 
average was around 20 per cent during the three episodes of over-leverage and 
reached a maximum of 33.4 per cent (the maximum reached during any episode 
of over-leverage during the last 60 years). Thus, countercyclical capital buffer 
may kick-in once the MAXCCDR positive gap exceeds the historical average 
of 20 per cent and increase linearly to reach the maximum of 2.5 per cent of the 
risk-weighted assets once the positive MAXCCDR gap reaches 33 per cent.
Regarding the determination of threshold for the release of capital buffer 
during times of stress, past three episodes of under-leverage during 1959-1962, 
1978-1995 and 1998-2004 (see Figure 2) were analysed. The Figure 9 presents 
the minimum, average, and maximum of the MAXCCDR negative gap during 
these three episodes of under-leverage. As Figure 9 shows, there is a large 
dispersion in minimum, average and maximum of the MAXCCDR negative gap 
among these episodes, though MAXCCDR negative gap has become moderate in 
recent episodes, as compared to the first episode during 1959-1962. This makes 
determination of threshold for release more arbitrary. Be that as it may, if the first 
episode is omitted from consideration, the capital buffer release may commence 
if the MAXCCDR negative gap goes beyond 10 per cent and increases linearly 
to exhaust the buffer of 2.5 per cent once the MAXCCDR negative gap reaches 
20 per cent. On the other hand, if all the three episodes are considered, the capital 
buffer release may commence if the MAXCCDR negative gap goes beyond 10 
per cent and increases linearly to exhaust the buffer of 2.5 per cent once the 
MAXCCDR negative gap reaches 30 per cent. 
Thus, to conclude, the alternative countercyclical capital buffer indicator 
that this paper recommends is MAXCCDR. Furthermore, the capital buffer build 
up process is recommended to commence once the positive MAXCCDR gap 
exceeds 20 per cent and increases linearly to reach the maximum of 2.5 per 
cent of the risk-weighted assets once the positive MAXCCDR gap reaches 33 
per cent. The capital buffer release process is recommended to commence once 
the negative MAXCCDR gap goes beyond 10 per cent and increases linearly to 
exhaust the maximum buffer of 2.5 per cent of the risk-weighted assets once the 
negative MAXCCDR gap reaches 30 per cent. 
7. Concluding Observations
While acknowledging the fact that supervisors in each jurisdiction are free to 
rely on any capital buffer guide and qualitative information that make sense to 
them for purposes of assessing the phase of the credit cycle and the associated 
level of system-wide risk, BCBS recommends credit-to-GDP as the preferable 
buffer guide for operating the countercyclical capital buffer. This paper attempts 
to explain why the BCBS buffer guide is not suitable for EMEs, both in ex post 
and ex-ante senses, and suggest an alternative buffer guide, namely MAXCCDR, 
which is a smoothened (moving maxima) composite credit deposit ratio. The 
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through graphical analysis and the measure of correlation coefficients in tracking 
credit cycles in India and found evidence of support and consistency from the 
behaviour of the real sector and the asset markets, apart from being able to be 
the forerunner of ensuing credit cycle behaviour. Further based on the episodes 
of positive and negative MAXCCDR gaps, thresholds for build up and release 
of capital buffers were determined, respectively.   
However, before concluding, it needs to be noted that this paper does 
not claim to have found the single indicator capable of guiding buffer decisions 
(both build up and release) in EMEs. All indicators provide false signals. Thus, 
no fully rule-based mechanism is perfect. Some degree of judgment, both for the 
build-up and particularly for the release phase, would be inevitable when setting 
countercyclical capital buffers in practice.
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of positive/negative gaps. In other words, the secular behaviour and the inflexion 
points of the credit cycles are by and large robust to the changes in weights. 
Thus, changes in weights do not materially matter.
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Figure 1:  Historical performance of Credit-to-GDP ratio in India
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Figure 1:  Historical performance of Credit-to-GDP ratio in India 
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Figure 2: MAXCCDR vis-à-vis Long-term Trend since 1950-51 
 











50 55 60 65 70 75 80 85 90 95 00 05 10
CGDP TCGDP400000
 
Figure 1:  Historical performance of Credit-to-GDP ratio in India 
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Figure 2: MAXCCDR vis-à-vis Long-term T end since 1950-5  
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Figure 3: Real GDP growth since 1950-51.









50 55 60 65 70 75 80 85 90 95 00 05 10
 









90 92 94 96 98 00 02 04 06 08 10
CGDPGAP400000 GDP
 












50 55 60 65 70 75 80 85 90 95 00 05 10
 









90 92 94 96 98 00 02 04 06 08 10
CGDPGAP400000 GDP
 















Applicability of Basel III Countercyclical Capital Buffer Guidance                                                                       23
 
to Emerging Market Economies: An Exploration: 1-30  
Figure 5: MAXCCDR and GDP since 1990-91.
Figure 6: Credit-to-GDP gap and Sensex returns.
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Figure 7: MAXCCDR gap and the Sensex returns.
Figure 8: MAXCCDR positive gap during episodes of over-leverage: 
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Figure 8: MAXCCDR positive gap during episodes of over-leverage: 
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Figure 8: MAXCCDR positive gap during episodes of over-leverage: 
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Figure 9: MAXCCDR Negative gap during episodes of under-leverage: 



































Figure 9: MAXCCDR Negative gap during episodes of under-leverage: 




                                                 
1 Dr. Rakesh Mohan attributed these factors to credit growth in India. However, this author feels that they 
also apply to EMEs in general too. 
2 The methodology proposed in this section relates to those EMEs, whose banking business model is 
primarily retail in nature, meaning retail deposits are the major component of liabilities. Hence, for the 
purpose of this section, EMEs refer to these jurisdictions. 
3 For the purpose of this paper, credit denotes bank credit and deposits mean deposits mobilised by banks. 
Since the EMEs’ financial sector, including India’s, is basically bank-dominated, CD ratio of banks is taken 
as a proxy for system-wise leverage. Incidentally, although non-bank credit in India has grown both in 
terms of flow and stock, it is felt that this trend is of recent origin maybe in 2000s.          
4 A further attempt was made by the authors to verify whether differential weights to absolute CD ratio and 
incremental CD ratio would have varying results. However, it was found that number of identified episodes 
of over/under leverage did not change, though there were marginal variations to the magnitude of 
positive/negative gaps. In other words, the secular behaviour and the inflexion points of the credit cycles 
are by and large robust to the changes in weights. Thus, changes in weights do not materially matter. 
5 Deviation of 3-year moving maxima of MAXCCDR from the trend accommodates prudent credit growth 
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Appendix 1




















1953-54 538 848 63 56 64 83 31.8 41.7 73.5
1954-55 623 943 66 89 66 89 33.0 44.7 77.8
1955-56 761 1043 73 138 73 138 36.5 69.0 105.5
1956-57 900 1175 77 105 77 138 38.3 69.0 107.3
1957-58 963 1452 66 23 77 138 38.3 69.0 107.3
1958-59 1014 1635 62 28 77 105 38.3 52.7 90.9
1959-60 1128 1902 59 43 66 43 33.2 21.3 54.5
1960-61 1336 1736 77 -125 77 43 38.5 21.3 59.8
1961-62 1408 1917 73 40 77 43 38.5 21.3 59.8
1962-63 1588 2042 78 144 78 144 38.9 72.0 110.9
1963-64 1817 2285 80 94 80 144 39.8 72.0 111.8
1964-65 2035 2583 79 73 80 144 39.8 72.0 111.8
1965-66 2287 2950 78 69 80 94 39.8 47.1 86.9
1966-67 2692 3425 79 85 79 85 39.4 42.6 82.0
1967-68 3032 3856 79 79 79 85 39.3 42.6 81.9
1968-69 3396 4338 78 76 79 85 39.3 42.6 81.9
1969-70 3971 5028 79 83 79 83 39.5 41.7 81.2
1970-71 4684 5906 79 81 79 83 39.7 41.7 81.3
1971-72 5263 7106 74 48 79 83 39.7 41.7 81.3
1972-73 6115 8643 71 55 79 81 39.7 40.6 80.3
1973-74 7399 10139 73 86 74 86 37.0 42.9 79.9
1974-75 8762 11827 74 81 74 86 37.0 42.9 80.0
1975-76 10877 14155 77 91 77 91 38.4 45.4 83.8
1976-77 13173 17566 75 67 77 91 38.4 45.4 83.8
1977-78 14939 22211 67 38 77 91 38.4 45.4 83.8
1978-79 18285 27016 68 70 75 70 37.5 34.8 72.3
1979-80 21537 31759 68 69 68 70 33.9 34.8 68.7
1980-81 25371 37988 67 62 68 70 33.9 34.8 68.7
1981-82 29682 43733 68 75 68 75 33.9 37.5 71.5
1982-83 35493 51358 69 76 69 76 34.6 38.1 72.7
1983-84 41294 60596 68 63 69 76 34.6 38.1 72.7
1984-85 48953 72244 68 66 69 76 34.6 38.1 72.7
1985-86 56067 85404 66 54 68 66 34.1 32.9 67.0
1986-87 63308 102724 62 42 68 66 33.9 32.9 66.8
1987-88 70536 118045 60 47 66 54 32.8 27.0 59.9
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1989-90 101453 166959 61 62 61 64 30.4 32.1 62.5
1990-91 116301 192541 60 58 61 64 30.4 32.1 62.5
1991-92 125592 230758 54 24 61 62 30.4 31.2 61.6
1992-93 151982 268572 57 70 60 70 30.2 34.9 65.1
1993-94 164418 315132 52 27 57 70 28.3 34.9 63.2
1994-95 211560 386859 55 66 57 70 28.3 34.9 63.2
1995-96 254015 433819 59 90 59 90 29.3 45.2 74.5
1996-97 278401 505599 55 34 59 90 29.3 45.2 74.5
1997-98 324079 598485 54 49 59 90 29.3 45.2 74.5
1998-99 368837 714025 52 39 55 49 27.5 24.6 52.1
1999-00 435958 813345 54 68 54 68 27.1 33.8 60.9
2000-01 511434 962618 53 51 54 68 26.8 33.8 60.6
2001-02 589723 1103360 53 56 54 68 26.8 33.8 60.6
2002-03 729215 1280853 57 79 57 79 28.5 39.3 67.8
2003-04 840785 1504416 56 50 57 79 28.5 39.3 67.8
2004-05 1100428 1700198 65 133 65 133 32.4 66.3 98.7
2005-06 1507077 2109049 71 99 71 133 35.7 66.3 102.0
2006-07 1931189 2611933 74 84 74 133 37.0 66.3 103.3
2007-08 2361914 3196939 74 74 74 99 37.0 49.7 86.7
2008-09 2775549 3834110 72 65 74 84 37.0 42.2 79.1
2009-10 3244788 4492826 72 71 74 74 36.9 36.8 73.8
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Appendix 2
Statistical Significance of Correlation Coefficients
An attempt was made to examine the statistical significance of the 
correlation coefficients estimated in this paper. Under H0: ρ = 0 and H1: ρ ≠ 0, the 
statistical significance was tested using the following formula for t-distribution 
with degrees of freedom = N-2 and N ≥ 6.
1)  The results of the statistical significance of the correlation coefficient 
between MAXCCDR gap and GDP are presented below.










1990-91 to 2009-10 0.66 3.622 17 0.002
1990-91 to 2003-04 0.24 0.856 12 0.41
2004-05 to 2009-10 0.69 Not calculated as N ‹ 6
As can be observed from above, the correlation coefficient for the period 
1990-91 to 2009-10 is highly significant. 
2)  The results of the statistical significance of the correlation coefficient 
between MAXCCDR gap and GDP gap are presented below.











1990-91 to 2009-10 0.57 2.86 17 0.01
1990-91 to 2003-04 0.22 0.78 12 0.44
2004-05 to 2009-10 0.76 Not calculated as N ‹ 6
As can be observed from the above, the correlation coefficient for the 
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3)  The results of the statistical significance of the correlation coefficient 
between MAXCCDR gap and Sensex return are presented below. 












1990-91 to 2009-10 0.18 0.754 17 0.46
1990-91 to 2003-04 -0.16 -0.561 12 0.58
2004-05 to 2009-10 0.63 Not calculated as N ‹ 6
As the above results indicate, the correlation coefficients between 
MAXCCDR gap and Sensex returns are not statistically significant.  
4)  The results of the statistical significance of the correlation coefficient 
between MAXCCDR gap and Sensex gap are presented below. 











1990-91 to 2009-10 0.30 1.297 17 0.21
1990-91 to 2003-04 -0.15 -0.526 12 0.608
2004-05 to 2009-10 0.59 Not calculated as N ‹ 6
As can be observed from the above, the correlation coefficients between 
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